GNSS Spoofing and mitigation in the Arabian Gulf

Geospatial Professional Practice Update & Latest Regional Developments (as of March 24th 2026)

By RICS Geospatial Expert Group

The Gulf region—one of the world’s most GNSS‑dependent geographies—is simultaneously one of the most interference‑prone. Recent data from shipping intelligence, maritime authorities, and Gulf governments shows a dramatic escalation in spoofing, jamming, AIS manipulation, and timing degradation across the Strait of Hormuz, UAE waters, Oman, Qatar, and the wider Gulf. The implications span navigation safety, land boundary integrity, mega‑project engineering, and national timing infrastructure.

This update integrates insights from IHO hydrographic standards, Galileo OSNMA developments, international geodesy agencies (IAG, UN‑GGIM geodesy), peer‑reviewed GNSS journals, and the RICS Guidelines for the Use of GNSS in Land Surveying and Mapping.

1. Latest GNSS Issues & News in the Gulf (2025–2026)

1.1 Surge in Maritime Interference & Spoofing

• 655 vessels have been affected by GNSS interference across the Middle East Gulf since the start of the Iran conflict, with 1,735 documented interference events, each typically 3–4 hours long. Daily incidents doubled from 350 to 672 in a matter of days, with approximately 600 jamming incidents off UAE waters, 80 off Iran, 50 off Oman, and 10 off Qatar¹.
• Interference hotspots are shifting closer to the UAE and Oman, likely linked to defensive countermeasures and high‑powered signals spilling across the region².

1.2 Qatar’s 2025 Nationwide Navigation Suspension

• In October 2025, Qatar halted all maritime navigation citing a “GPS fault”—later interpreted by analysts as severe spoofing extending from the Strait of Hormuz. Vessels reported position drifts of 2–5 nm and AIS anomalies showing multiple ships reporting identical spoofed coordinates³.
• Telecommunications networks logged PTP timing holdover of up to 25 minutes, showing that spoofing impacts extend beyond maritime navigation into national timing infrastructure⁴.

1.3 AIS & GPS Spoofing Across the Persian Gulf

• Since mid‑2025, vessels have reported GPS jamming and AIS spoofing that falsely placed them in sanctioned jurisdictions, creating compliance and safety risks. Authorities have issued advisories encouraging alternative navigation methods and vigilance around the Strait of Hormuz⁵.

1.4 Regional Navigation Advisories

• Major GPS disruptions across Bandar-e‑Pars, Strait of Hormuz, Port Sudan, and the Suez approaches were reported in October 2025, prompting Qatar to impose temporary nighttime sailing restrictions due to “unprecedented” GNSS degradation. AIS speed anomalies and GNSS drifts were widely observed⁶.

1.5 Latest Operational Reporting

• March 2026 analysis confirms ongoing GNSS interference across Hormuz, highlighting techniques that bridge teams use to detect spoofing, manage sensor failures, and maintain safety under degraded satellite geometry⁷.
   

2. International Standards & Reference Frameworks

2.1 IHO Hydrographic and Navigation Guidance

IHO documents on GNSS interference emphasise continuous cross-checking with radar, inertial systems, and alternative positioning layers—foundational to safe navigation in spoofing‑prone waters.

2.2 Galileo OSNMA & GNSS Authentication

Galileo’s Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) is increasingly relevant in spoofing‑dense regions. Open datasets (e.g., FGI) demonstrate OSNMA’s ability to detect spoofing impairments across clean and compromised conditions, validating its operational value for Gulf operators.

2.3 UN‑GGIM and IAG Geodesy Frameworks

The international geodesy community (IAG and UN‑GGIM) emphasises:

• global reference frame integrity
• resilience through multi‑sensor, multi‑constellation design
• geodetic infrastructure monitoring

Resources:

• International Association of Geodesy
• UN Global Geodetic Reference Frame (UN‑GGRF)

2.4 RICS GNSS Professional Standard

The RICS “Guidelines for the Use of GNSS in Land Surveying and Mapping” require:

• multi‑constellation use
• robust field validation
• metadata retention
• integrity monitoring

Source: Use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) in land surveying and mapping, 3rd edition
 

3. Geospatial Sector Practice for the Gulf Region

A. Marine & Hydrographic Operations

A.1 Detection & Monitoring

• Monitor ECDIS positional inconsistencies, radar‑GNSS mismatches, and AIS anomalies—all widely reported during spoofing events in Qatar and across Hormuz^{8 9}.
• Watch for drifting positions (e.g., 2–5 nm drift rings) characteristic of spoofing rather than jamming¹⁰.

A.2 Operational Response

• Switch to Dead Reckoning, manual plotting, radar ranges, and celestial checks when GNSS alarms occur.
• Reduce reliance on autopilot in interference zones; this matches guidance issued to vessels operating in the Red Sea–Hormuz corridor¹¹.

A.3 Resilient Technology Integration

• Deploy multi‑constellation receivers (GPS + Galileo + BeiDou + GLONASS) for redundancy—critical given the Gulf’s demonstrated multi‑hour spoofing events.
• Enable Galileo OSNMA for authenticated signals where available.
• Add IMUs and doppler radar to improve resistance, DVL (Doppler Velocity Log) as part of an IMU-based navigation solution.
• Review and investigate independent positioning systems such as Laser-based relative positioning systems (RPS) when alongside vessels and structures.
• Sub surface positioning– acoustic positioning relative to a deployed seabed transponder e.g. USBL or within an existing array e.g. LBL.

A.4 Compliance & Legal Risk

• Maintain voyage records; AIS spoofing has been used to falsify port calls in sanctioned jurisdictions, creating serious compliance risk for operators¹².
• Health and safety considerations - adhere to, or increase, horizontal exclusion zones from assets, vessels, structures etc.
   

B. Land Surveying Applications

B.1 Field Detection & Validation

• Follow RICS guidance: always check constellation health, run multi-session occupations, and never trust a single epoch in suspected interference zones.
• Monitor cycle slips, ambiguous residuals, and constellation imbalance during times of reported regional spoofing surges (e.g., 600+ jamming events reported off the UAE)¹³.

B.2 Multi‑Constellation & Multi‑Frequency

• Use L1/L2/L5 (GPS), E1/E5a/E5b (Galileo), B1/B2 (BeiDou) and verify each constellation’s consistency.
• Cross-check GNSS with total stations and IMU‑aided rovers.

B.3 Data Logging & Control

• Store raw GNSS (RINEX) data for post-processing.
• Compare against known control points tied to ITRF and UN‑GGIM global geodetic references.
• Increase ground based control points, use networks with confirmed coordinate transformation parameters.

B.4 Quality Assurance

• Ensure metadata and integrity flags are included in deliverables per RICS GNSS professional standards and GEOSA land survey specifications.
   

C. Engineering & Construction Applications

C.1 Multi-Sensor Fusion

• Use GNSS fused with total stations, LiDAR, IMUs, and machine-control sensors—critical on megaprojects spanning interference hotspots.

C.2 Real‑Time Integrity Monitoring

• Configure automated alarms for coordinate jumps, sudden heading shifts, or improbable kinematics.
• Gulf interference durations of 3–4 hours per event make machine-control systems particularly vulnerable¹⁴.

C.3 PPP/RTK Resilience

• Use authenticated PPP corrections and maintain RTK fallback strategies.
• Validate time synchronisation when network timing drifts (e.g., PTP holdovers observed in Qatar) occur¹⁵.
   

4. Strategic Recommendations for Gulf Geospatial Stakeholders

4.1 Adopt GNSS Authentication - Prioritise Galileo OSNMA-capable receivers and authenticated PPP services.

4.2 Build Redundancy into All Positioning - Fuse GNSS with terrestrial, inertial, and optical positioning following IAG/UN‑GGIM resilience frameworks.

4.3 Timing - The use of satellite derived timing for control and system management can also be sensitive to any outages or jamming. Redundancy of integrated system may be limited due to the availability of accurate time over various periods if outages of jamming occur. Possible mitigation using Caesium atomic clocks could potentially provide a back-up and holdover capability.

4.4 Establish Cross‑Sector Interference Reporting - Regional collaborative reporting—industry + hydrographic offices + survey authorities—mirrors best practices seen in Europe.

4.5 Training & Scenario Drills - Given the Gulf’s proven vulnerability, regular spoofing‑scenario training is an important consideration for all operators (such as marine pilots, surveyors, construction engineers). Rule 2 of RICS Rules of Conduct states that members and firms must maintain their professional competence and ensure that services are provided by competent individuals who have the necessary expertise.
 

5. Conclusion

GNSS spoofing in the Gulf is now a persistent operational reality, not an anomaly. With over 655 vessels, 1,735 interference events, multi‑kilometre position drifts, AIS manipulation, and telecom timing degradation, the region requires a resilience‑first geospatial strategy rooted in international geodesy standards, IHO navigation practice, Galileo authentication, and RICS‑aligned GNSS professionalism.